I'll spend a few minutes, and then there are just one or two reporters here, I can see them. And I'm happy to take a few questions. 

 

I really do appreciate, actually, all of you, because all of you support what we do in so many ways. And I'm a great believer in that integrated support. And in the debate, obviously, in our country, that has been important to me, as I have grown up over many, many years. And I think the diversity of views and the debate get us, in the long run, to the right answer. And so I appreciate this institute – and your leadership, Tom, and what you do and what you represent. 

 

And I would look to – I know this is an auspicious occasion because of the opening of the new study center – and I would look to the future – and I'll try to actually pose a few ideas that would be helpful, actually, as I look out into the future – not that we don't have a lot of work to do, and a lot of challenges in both Iraq and Afghanistan. But, looking beyond that – and trying to figure out what's next, and what should we be ready for, and what are the challenges that are out there long-term for us as a country? And, certainly, for us, as a military.

 

 I'll cover three quick areas and then open it up for questions. First of all, main focus since I took the job has been the broader Middle East. Heavily focused on Iraq, obviously, when I took over, and Afghanistan and Pakistan. And, for me – and I think last July was my 13^th trip to Pakistan since a year ago February. And it speaks to the priority, and my belief in the importance of relationships to try to understand each other. 

 

 And they're a country that we left for 12 years – from 1990 to 2002. And I don't think we yet understand the deficit of trust that that created, which is only going to be built back over time. It's not going to come back overnight; it's not going to come back on our terms, or their terms, exactly. It will only come back over time; through, I think, constant engagement and a better understanding.

 

 When I go to Pakistan and Afghanistan, the question that gets posed routinely – either implied or asked – is: Are you staying this time, or are you leaving? Because we left both those countries in ways, and the adults who are in those countries right now all remember that. 

 
And I don't know how else to establish a long-term relationship, except it takes time to do that. And in ways we're just beginning, or we're digging ourselves out of holes that were established in the last several decades.

 

 So clearly focused on Iraq. And right now, Iraq – and I don't want to lose focus on Iraq, because it's still critically important. We're on a good path, but it is still – there are still huge challenges there. And these next six months, as we get through elections – and then start a fairly, a very rapid decline of force levels after the elections in January, and starting next spring – down to the 35 or 50,000. Less than a year from now. And doing that in a way that sustains the gains and the success – but, in fact, really, the Iraqis are in the lead right now. 

 

And I think the big challenges in Iraq right now are, by and large, political. And we've been concerned lately with some of the bombings. What, actually, I watch for very carefully is responses – is the issue of sectarian violence, and does it break out? And it hasn't. 

And, actually, Prime Minister Maliki and his security forces have responded to that wake-up call, I think, in a very positive way. So we still have 125, 130,000 troops there. And we'll come down a little bit between now and the end of the year, but we will not start coming down substantially until the spring.

 

Afghanistan and Pakistan – the president came in, spent the first couple of months looking at a strategy. Actually, I asked him to, and Secretary Gates asked him to, approve 17,000 troops initially, and another 4,000 trainers, which he did before – in February – before we finished the strategic review, which he then rolled out. And it's a comprehensive strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan, with great focus on not just the military side, but on the civilian side – as well a new ambassador. 

 

 Subsequent to that, the president approved – at my recommendation and Sec. Gates’s recommendation – the change out of leadership that that put Gen. McChrystal in, and almost an entire new team in that regard. And that happened in June. And, clearly, Gen. McChrystal's assessment -- which is back with us now, and which we're putting through the process, quite frankly. 

 

 And in that postelection process – and we need to get to a postelection state in Afghanistan, and we're not there right now. And we're working our way through that. When I say “we,” it’s really the Afghans that are working their way through that right now. And then in that time to evaluate where we are, to look at the strategic objectives: the baseline assumptions – the first principles, if you will. And we're in discussions in that right now. And then, after that, arriving at a position on that, there will, I'm sure, be a resource decision that's associated with that. 

 

And I'm very much aware – and the headlines today certainly single that out – that there's great interest in the number of troops. There's a lot more in play, in my view, than the number of troops.

 

 One of the questions we have to ask is, speak to – and I spoke to this yesterday in testimony – is the legitimacy of this government in Afghanistan. And, clearly, there is a need for some level of good governance at every level – not just out of Kabul, but all the way down to the villages. 

And so how do you deliver some level of good governance to a population that hasn't seen it for a while, and that needs goods and services, and is actually anxious to have that? Not just from Kabul, but from every level. And that's a question that needs an answer, and certainly is part of the discussion that we're having right now.

 

 There are many others. The strategy is focused on al-Qaida; it's focused on the safe haven; it's focused on making sure Afghanistan doesn't return to what it was before, in terms of providing a safe haven. And so all those are the kinds of things that we're very focused on right now, as assessed by Gen. McChrystal, who is the new commander. I might point out he's been out there not quite three months. And the pieces of the strategy that were laid out, that was laid out in March are just getting put into place. 

 

 So an awful lot of focus there. There's a lot of focus on Pakistan and that relationship. And I get asked often about Pakistan, and, particularly, the military, where I spend a lot of time. And you look back over the last 12 months or so, and look at what Pakistan has accomplished. There were many before that that had grave doubts about whether they could do anything like that – whether they even focused in that direction. And they have, and they will continue to do that. That said, they are still very focused on India. That is not going to go away. They see them as the threat. So we have to recognize that in our relationship with them.

 

 And we've done a much more comprehensive strategy. There's a Kerry-Lugar bill that is on the Hill right now; I think is very important – not just for the resources, which are there in that bill, but for the 5-year commitment. And this gets back to question one, is: Are you going to be here for a while? So a lot of time there.

 

But the broader Middle East is a pretty broad place. And so, clearly, concerns continue about Iran. And that they develop – and I believe that they are still on a path to develop nuclear weapons. And while the political turmoil certainly exists there internally, their military is moving right along – the Kudz force is moving right along. And the strategic concerns I have about the potential for Iran to continue to stabilize that part of the world remain.

 

 The challenge that also exists in the Middle East with Syria and Lebanon, and the relationships that we have with countries like Egypt – and, obviously, our relationship with Israel and Jordan, and that part of the world. So all of those things still very much in play, and will be, I think, for the foreseeable future.

 

 The second area is what I call “held to the force” – reset, reconstitute; so the two themes there. One is for our force – best I've ever been associated with it. I've been doing this longer than most. Started in Vietnam; it’s the best military I’ve ever been associated with. Most combat experience that we've had; and so I'm very focused.

 

 As we look to the future, and what does the future entail, a lot of that is tied to how we take care of those who’ve given so much, and retain those who have gained more knowledge than they even know, as they become more senior. So a great deal of focus on that: young junior officers, NCO’s, and also families, who've been through a lot. 

 

 And, yes, they’re prepped. And the Marine Corps now is to the point where it’s dwell time between deployments; we’re about – by and large, we're about 1.5. Not too long ago we were at one-to-one – one to 1.5.  By that, I mean you deploy for seven months; and when we’re one-to-one, you’re back for seven months, and you keep doing that. The Marine Corps has moved out to about 10 or 11 months in between seven-month deployments. That’s not for everybody, but, for the majority. 

 

 For the Army – and I think the Army's still the center of gravity of our military – it's still about one-to-one. But over the next couple of years, making an assumption about the drawdown in Iraq, and certain force levels in Afghanistan, we will see the Army start to move fairly significantly towards an increased dwell time that'll get us out to two-to-one, which is what we're shooting for – twice as long at home. And we need that, in many ways.

 

 All of that said, the force and the families have been unbelievably resilient. If you had taken me back to 2000 or 2001, and said, this is what I'm going to do for the next 9 years, not a lot of us would have said, gee, that looks, you know, really possible. And it gets back to who they are, and what they've been able to do, and how they've adapted and how great they are. 

 

I don't it for granted; every single day I think about them. And, actually, I see some of my old friends here. When I used to have a lot of money – that's when I was a CNO. (Laughter.) As the chairman, I don't have any money anymore. (Laughter.) Or you can look at it that way – or I have all of it. (Laughter.) So when asked about where to put the next marginal dollar to bet for the future, I want to put it on people first. 

 

And that's a pretty tough issue, because we all know it's right. They're our most critical – and, yet, most expensive – resource. And it's also something that we don't spend a lot of time on in this town – other than individually, or at the subcommittee level. 

 
But at the leadership level, how do we get this right, when we know health care in the military is running out of control?Not just in the country, but in the military, our expenses are going through the roof. And they become expenses that we have to pay every year. And, in the end, particularly as budgets get tighter, you know, the procurement accounts suffer and have suffered and will suffer. 

 

 So getting it right for our people – making the bet there for the future – it's not the only place to put it. I thought the work that Sec. Gates did – and I was alongside him for that – on the ’10 amended budget – was the best programming and budget work I've seen, and I've been doing budgets since the mid-’90s. Very hard decisions – we have to make them. We can't afford 100-percent solutions; we can't afford perfection in every single program; and we can't afford programs that can't contain themselves. And so I think you'll see more of that in the future. 

 

 And that's not all bad. You know, in recent years we lost our analytical capability; we lost our ability to prioritize. It wasn't necessary to make hard decisions because the budgets were going up so fast. And these things always go in cycles, and we are hitting that cycle, and so we've got to be very smart about how we do that for the future.

 

 So taking care of our people – also wounded; surviving families – and make sure that they are basically in good shape for the rest of their lives. And we’ve improved dramatically in those areas, but we still have a long way to go.

 

 And then lastly is the rest of the world, and there's a lot of stuff going on in the rest of the world. And so a year or so ago – I think it was, actually, a year ago last October – we set up AFRICOM because many of us believe that focusing on that continent, as other co-coms do – in terms of relationship-building and understanding challenges – is very preventative. 

 

 And we had early challenges with that, but Kip Ward, who's leading that command brilliantly, is – we're making progress – and it's going to take some time. But AFRICOM – that speech to focusing, there, the kind of relationship-building we're doing in Latin America.

And, clearly, there are challenges in the Pacific. I can point to North Korea very specifically; a growing China, a rising China. And what does that mean? And that is one of the long-term questions; I get asked it frequently. And over the last several years, 2 or 3 years, beyond strategic intent – what is your strategic intent – you know, trying to understand that from China, we haven't made a lot of progress in understanding that. And they have some significant internal challenges, as well as what they're doing externally, as they grow, and they build their military, which we're all watching. 

 

 There are challenges in other parts of the world. Certainly, what has happened with an emergent, or a re-emergent, Russia, and what does that mean? A Russia that has tremendous demographic challenges, infrastructure challenges, but is a critical, critical player in Europe and in that part of the world. And so how do we deal with that relationship, and the challenges that that will bring, as well? 

 

So there are many things beyond Iraq and Afghanistan; the challenges that are out there are demographics – and what does that mean for us as a country? And what does it mean, inside that, for our military; and the military strength, quite frankly, that I think we have to have and sustain?

 

 There is a growing concern for climate change – and what does that mean? And I don't know the answer to that, but I'm hoping that there can be some thoughtful work done that starts to really clarify that. Resources that are drying up – oil, water. What's going on in the Arctic? 

 
Actually, I go overseas here shortly, and in Europe I will meet with my Norwegian and Danish, Swedish counterparts. It’s question one for them. And if you watch the money flow – watch investment up there – there's something going on up there. And, eventually, there will be a security requirement associated with that. And what does that mean for us, and how do we work our way through that? So there are a lot of challenges beyond the ones we have right now. 

 

And then I'll close with the destination for us as a military after Iraq and Afghanistan. And after we come back, and our dwell time's okay – and how are we positioned, and what kind of military should we have?  And where, at least, the secretary and I are headed right now is this rebalancing associated with focusing on unconventional, irregular, asymmetric, you-pick-the-term warfare that has become such a critical requirement for us; and will be not just now, in the wars that we're in, but will be in the future.