| Air War College
speech As Delivered by Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates Maxwell Air Force Base-Gunter Annex, Ala. April 15, 2009
Good morning. It’s a pleasure to be back at Maxwell.
As you may know, this week I am visiting each of the
service war colleges to discuss the budget
recommendations I made to the President. Those
recommendations have three principal objectives:
·
First, to reaffirm our commitment to take care of
the all-volunteer force, which, in my view represents
America’s greatest strategic asset; as Admiral Mullen
says, if we don’t get the people part of our business
right, no other decisions will matter;
·
Second, to rebalance this department’s programs
in order to institutionalize and enhance our
capabilities to fight the wars we are in today and the
scenarios we are most likely to face in the years ahead,
while at the same time providing a hedge against other
risks and contingencies; and
·
Third, in order to do all this, we must reform
how and what we buy, meaning a fundamental overhaul of
our approach to procurement, acquisition, and
contracting.
During my visit to Quantico on
Monday, I was asked why I decided to go to the war colleges
to discuss this topic. What I said then, and repeat now, is
that these recommendations are less about budget numbers
than they are about how the U.S. military thinks about and
prepares for the future. Fundamentally, the proposals are
about how we think about the nature of warfare. About how
we take care of our people. About how we institutionalize
support for the warfighter for the long term. About the role
of the services and how we can buy weapons as jointly as we
fight. About reforming our requirements and acquisition
processes. These are just the kinds of basic questions you
will be dealing with as you go on to senior staff and
command positions.
So with that in mind, for the
next few minutes I want to give you some more insight into
the thinking and analysis behind my budget recommendations,
and then give you a chance to ask questions and share your
views.
In many ways, these
recommendations are really a reflection of my experiences in
this job for the past two-plus years. Starting with the
roll-out of the Iraq surge, my overriding priority has been
getting troops at the front everything they need to fight,
to win, and to survive while making sure that they and their
families are properly cared for when they return. And
whether the issue was fixing outpatient care, getting better
armored vehicles, or sending more ISR capability to theater,
I kept running into the fact that the Department of Defense
as an institution – which routinely complained that the rest
of government was not at war – was itself not on a war
footing, even as young Americans were fighting and dying
every day.
For too long there was a view,
or a hope, that Iraq and Afghanistan were exotic
distractions that would be wrapped up relatively soon – the
regimes toppled, the insurgencies crushed, the troops
brought home. Therefore, we should not spend too much, or
buy too much equipment not already in our procurement plans,
or turn our bureaucracies and processes upside down. As a
result, the kinds of capabilities that were most urgently
needed by our warfighters in theater were for the most part
fielded ad hoc and on the fly, developed outside the regular
bureaucracy and funded in supplemental appropriations that
would go away when the wars did – if not sooner.
The wars we are in clearly
have not earned much of a constituency in the Pentagon as
compared to the services’ conventional modernization
programs. That was the root of my frustration when I came to
Maxwell a year ago and spoke about “pulling teeth” to get
more ISR. And this situation applied as well to programs to
care for and reduce the stress on people – the troops and
their families – as a result of the conflicts in Iraq and
Afghanistan.
This did not mean that
conventional capabilities and preparing for other
contingencies were not important. It was a matter of
balance. I just wanted to see that the needs of the
warfighter – on the battlefield, at home, or in the hospital
– had a seat at the table when priorities were being set and
long-term base budget decisions were being made. And one of
the things I’ve learned since entering government 43 years
ago is that the best way to ensure that an organization
really cares for and protects something – as a lioness does
her cubs – is to put that thing in its base budget.
So, the top priority
recommendation I made to the president was to move programs
that support the warfighters and their families into the
services’ base budget, where they can acquire a bureaucratic
constituency and long-term funding. This includes, among
others, more funding for medical research and treatment for
TBI and post-traumatic stress, improved child care, spousal
support, lodging, and education. In addition, priorities
such as expanding the ground forces and halting Air Force
and Navy manpower reductions were put in the base budget, as
was increasing funding for special operations, helicopter
support, and ISR.
With regard to ISR, I would be
remiss in this setting if I did not give credit where credit
is due for what has been accomplished over the past
year. We’ve seen a dramatic increase in UAV orbits in
theater – from 23 combat air patrols twelve months ago, to
34 today. The Air Force also stood up a second schoolhouse
and created a new operational specialty for unmanned system
pilots. Due to that second schoolhouse we are projected to
reach 50 combat air patrols by Fiscal Year 2011. With Task
Force Odin deployed in Iraq, and now Task Force Liberty in
Afghanistan, we’ve seen how a modest expenditure to mate
advanced sensors to turbo-prop aircraft can make a huge
difference to the men and women at the front. This year’s
budget recommendations include more funds for hardware and
operations support in the area of ISR processing,
exploitation, and dissemination.
These proposals, then, begin the effort to establish an institutional home in the Department of Defense for today’s warfighter as well as tomorrow’s.
Another theme underlying my
recommendations is the need to think about future conflicts
in a different way. To recognize that the black and white
distinction between irregular war and conventional war is an
outdated model. We must understand that we face a more
complex future than that, a future where all conflict will
range along a broad spectrum of operations and
lethality. Where near-peers will use irregular or asymmetric
tactics and non-state actors may have weapons of mass
destruction or sophisticated missiles as well as AK-47s and
RPGs. This kind of warfare will require capabilities with
the maximum possible flexibility to deal with the widest
possible range of conflict.
Now, even with this in mind –
perhaps especially with this in mind, we cannot ignore the
risks posed by the military forces of other state
actors. This is a particularly salient issue for this group,
as the weight of America’s conventional and strategic
strength has shifted to our air and naval forces. This
brings me to some of our conventional and strategic
modernization programs, which continue to make up the
overwhelming bulk of the department’s procurement, research,
and development accounts.
Broadly speaking, there were
several principles or criteria that governed, either in
total or in part, most of my major program decisions. The
first was to halt or delay production on systems that relied
on promising, but unproven, technology, while continuing to
produce – and, if necessary, upgrade – systems that are best
in class and that we know work. This was a factor in my
decisions to:
·
Cancel the Transformational Satellite (TSAT) program
and instead build more Advanced Extremely High Frequency
(AEHF) satellites;
·
Cap the Navy’s DDG-1000 ships at three while
increasing the buy of Arleigh Burke-class destroyers; and
·
Halt the airborne laser at the R&D phase while
increasing funding for the THAAD missile defense program.
Furthermore, where different
modernization programs within services existed to counter
roughly the same threat, or accomplish roughly the same
mission, we should look more to capabilities available
across the services. While the military has made great
strides in operating jointly over the last two decades,
procurement remains overwhelmingly service-centric. The
Combat Search and Rescue helicopter had major development
and cost problems to be sure. What cemented my decision to
cancel this program was the fact that we were on the verge
of launching yet another single-service platform for a
mission that in the real world is truly joint. This is a
question we must consider for all of the services’
modernization portfolios.
Another important thing I
looked at was whether modernization programs, in particular
ground modernization programs, had incorporated the
operational and combat experiences of Iraq and
Afghanistan. The problem with the Army’s Future Combat
Systems vehicles was that a program designed nine years ago
did not adequately reflect the lessons of close-quarter
combat and improvised explosive devices that have taken a
fearsome toll on our troops and their vehicles in Iraq, and
now in Afghanistan.
Finally, I concluded we need
to shift away from the 99 percent “exquisite”
service-centric platforms that are so costly and complex
that they take forever to build and only then in very
limited quantities. With the pace of technological and
geopolitical change, and the range of possible
contingencies, we must look more to the 80 percent
multi-service solution that can be produced on time, on
budget, and in significant numbers. As Stalin once said,
“Quantity has a quality all of its own.”
This was a major consideration
with shipbuilding and air superiority. I recommended
accelerating the buy of the Littoral Combat Ship, which,
despite its development problems, is a versatile vessel that
can be produced in quantity and go to places that are either
too shallow or too dangerous for the Navy’s big, blue water
surface combatants. As we saw last week, you don’t
necessarily need a billion-dollar ship to chase down a bunch
of teenage pirates.
I also believe these budget
recommendations demonstrate a serious commitment to
maintaining U.S. air supremacy, the sine qua non of American
military strength for more than six decades. This budget
increased funding from $6.8 to $11.2 billion for the fifth
generation F-35, accelerating the development and testing
regime to fix the remaining problems and begin rolling out
these aircraft in quantity – more than 500 over the next
five years, and more than 2,400 total for all the services.
When examining the issue of
air supremacy, we had to ask, what is the right mix of
weapons to deal with the span of threats? What are the
things that the F-22, and only the F-22, can do – and where
would it be required? There is no doubt that the F-22 has
unique capabilities that we need – the penetration and
defeat of an advanced enemy air defense and fighter
fleet. But, the F-22 is, in effect, a niche, silver-bullet
solution required for a limited number of scenarios – to
overcome advanced enemy fighters and air defense systems. In
assessing the F-22 requirement, we also considered the
advanced stealth and superior air-to-ground capabilities
provided by the fifth-generation F-35s now being accelerated
in this budget, the growing capability and range of unmanned
platforms like the Reaper, and other systems in the Air
Force and in other services. I also considered the fact that
Russia is probably 6 years away from Initial Operating
Capability of a fifth-generation fighter and the Chinese are
10 to 12 years away. By then we will have more than 1,000
fifth-generation fighters in our inventory. In light of all
these factors, and on the recommendation of the Air Force
secretary and chief of staff, I concluded that 183 – the
program of record since 2005 – plus four would be a
sufficient number to meet requirements. To be clear, the
F-22 program of record as codified in the FY 2005 budget
(and all budgets since) will be completed, and not cut as
many have said and reported.
Looking forward, the goal of
our weapons buying is to develop a portfolio – a mixture of
weapons whose flexibility allows us to respond to a spectrum
of contingencies on or beyond the horizon. Focusing
exclusively, or obsessively, on a single weapons system
designed to do a specific job or confront a single adversary
ignores what a truly joint force can and must do in the 21st
century.
Where the trend of future
conflict is clear, I have made specific recommendations. In
other areas, however, I believe that we need to develop a
more rigorous analytical framework before moving forward –
the type of framework that will be provided by the
Quadrennial Defense Review. I should note that this will be
the first QDR able to fully incorporate the numerous lessons
learned on the battlefield these past few years. Lessons
about what tactics future adversaries, both state and
non-state actors, are likely to pursue – especially given
our conventional dominance in air and at sea.
Again, as noted earlier, one
thing that is clear is that, going forward, the distinction
between high-end and low-end war, between mechanized battles
and stability operations, are blurring to the point where
the old definitions of conventional and unconventional are
no longer useful. War in the future will often be a hybrid
blend of tactics. Where a nation-state might deploy a mix of
crude and advanced weapons to limit options, disrupt freedom
of action, or deny access to key assets such as forward air
bases.
We have started to address
these developments in the budget recommendations. The QDR,
as well as other reviews like the Nuclear Posture Review,
will examine these issues more closely. That is one reason I
delayed some decisions to do with, for example, amphibious
operations and the next generation cruiser: to develop an
intellectual construct through which we can more precisely
determine what requirements and capabilities will be needed
in the future.
A few examples relevant to the
Air Force:
·
Before continuing with a program for a manned bomber,
we should first assess the requirements and what other
capabilities we might have for this mission – as well as the
outcome of post-START arms-control negotiations.
·
We know that the future will see an increase in
unmanned systems of all kinds – with further reach and more
capabilities. What are the implications of this reality on
the number and types of manned fighters we need, since the
UAVs must be considered a key component of our air
capabilities?
·
And, since UAVs do not re-fuel midair, how will
this affect the number of tankers we buy? Having said that,
I am committed to moving forward on the rebid for the Air
Force’s KC-X tanker as quickly as possible – hopefully by
this summer. Our aging tankers, the lifeblood of any
expeditionary force, are in serious need of replacement.
As we look towards the future,
I have directed the QDR team to be realistic about the
scenarios where direct U.S. military action would be
required. We have to be prepared for the wars we are most
likely to fight – not just the wars we’re best suited to
fight, or threats we conjure up from potential adversaries
with unlimited time and resources. And as I’ve said before,
even when considering challenges from nation-states with
modern militaries, the answer is not necessarily buying more
technologically advanced versions of what we built – on
land, sea, or air – to stop the Soviets during the Cold War.
While there were many other
issues that arose, and many other decisions that were made,
I’d like to give you some time to ask questions. I’ll close
with a final thought.
Throughout its history, the
Air Force has constantly re-invented itself to meet evolving
threats – one of the primary reasons we have such air
dominance today. Indeed, all of the services are challenged
to find the right balance between preserving what is unique
and valuable in their traditions, while at the same time
making the changes necessary to win the wars we are in and
be prepared for future threats. With this budget, I have
tried to make a holistic assessment of capabilities,
requirements, risks, and needs across the services. I ask
you to do the same – to look outside your area of specialty,
and outside your military branch. To look forward with the
certainty that the battlefield is constantly evolving, and
that the Air Force and the joint force must always be
evolving with it.
Thank you for your being here
this morning, and for your continued service to our country.
Let’s take some questions.
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