By David A. Fulghum
Aviation Week & Space Technology
January 29, 2007

The stealthy Raptor fighter and intelligence-gathering aircraft is ready for war, but probably not the war we've got, says Air Combat Command's chief, Gen. Ronald E. Keys.

Essential electronic surveillance systems may be too sensitive--overwhelmed by the density of U.S. and allied emitters--to be useful in the electronically polluted environment of Baghdad, the main focus of the new U.S. military surge.

"If war breaks out, I'm sending the F-22," Keys told Aviation Week & Space Technology last week. But not for operations in Iraq or Afghanistan. "I didn't buy the F-22 for Iraq. We're looking for what can sop up intelligence, reconnaissance and surveillance [ISR] in Iraq and Afghanistan. Is the investment [of sending the F-22] worth it? Is it a good idea or just an attractive idea? Will it complicate the air component commander's problems for no gain?"

Keys is not yet convinced and the interference problems are growing.

"Right now we get into situations where we jam against improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and it corrupts our radio traffic [and] some line-of-sight UAV operations," Keys says. "It's tough."

The intense jamming may degrade, perhaps blind, some key F-22 electronic surveillance sensors when operating around the capital city. But some F-22 supporters contend that prediction of the Raptors vulnerability is being overstated and its capabilities "are sophisticated enough" to ensure that it will still be a valuable intelligence-gathering platform, says a senior Air Force official.

Those with insight into the program say the problem is not in the F-22's capabilities, but that they've not yet tested the Raptor in such a dense environment and codified the necessary concept of operations and tactics . However, they point out that the aircraft's entire electronic surveillance capabilities can be fine-tuned during mission planning. "They can filter in the frequencies they don't want to work, eliminate those that are being jammed, specify scan rates and frequencies and how often they hop between them," says one specialist. "You can exquisitely tailor each mission."

Nonetheless, Keys is not yet convinced that there is enough added value to merit sending F-22s from their new, forward base in Okinawa to someplace in-theater--possibly Al Udeid AB, Qatar, where many allied intelligence aircraft are based.

There is a need for more airborne intelligence gathering in Iraq, Keys concedes. The decision point will be whether the F-22 can do something that's not already being done or do it faster or with greater resolution. "Would I be better off sending more RC-135 [Rivet Joint signals intelligence intercept aircraft] down there?" he asks. "That's the discussion going on."

Keys is known by both his critics and supporters to be practical to a fault. He is not swayed by promises of technological effectiveness, but instead demands that it be demonstrated. That hasn't happened yet. There also appears to be reluctance within the Pentagon to the idea of operating F-22s in a war against insurgents when the fighter is optimized for cruise missile defense and long-range offensive and defensive air-to-air combat.

"A lot of people say we don't need the F-22 in Iraq," Keys says. "That's probably true." His reasoning lies in the classified strengths of the aircraft and its possible weaknesses in the war against insurgents. Fighting irregulars effectively depends on accurate and rapid intelligence collection--one of the things the F-22 does best.

"The only application [for F-22 in Iraq and Afghanistan] would be ISR," Keys says. "That would be the supposition for sending it." But a possible vulnerability in the stealth fighter's legendary electronic surveillance system--located in the leading edges of the wings and vertical tails--became apparent during operations by the first operational squadron flying in the Chesapeake Bay area. The strong radars on nearby Navy ships were overwhelming the delicate sensors.

"You've got to tune down the [ESM sensors'] sensitivity," he says. Making such corrections is "one reason it's a software-[run] airplane. I don't think it's a fatal flaw, but we now realize that in some situations we may not be able to see some of the [intelligence] we wanted to because we simply jam it off the air."

The primary source of that interference is the jammers that have proliferated to foil IEDs that now cause 70% of the U.S. casualties in Iraq.

"I don't see how [the F-22's electronic surveillance system] can be used there," Keys says. "I've been operating [in Iraq and Afghanistan] since the war kicked off with Rivet Joints, and they haven't figured it out. They have a lot of people sitting in the back-end with lots of analyzers, and they're still trying to read [communications] traffic through jamming."

The problem appears to be one of electronic command and control and giving authority to someone who can make the call about when to jam. That's an explosive subject, because jamming is invariably being used to save lives.

There is a burning need for a joint entity to police the battlefield and bring organization to the jamming, they say.

"We have to have more visibility of what's going on and where," Keys notes. "Right now we don't. We didn't anticipate there was going to be this level of jamming. Every patrol is out there with personal jammers. We've got lots of airplanes that are also jamming. At the same time, we've got people trying to listen [to insurgent conversations], a lot of it on the same or overlapping frequencies."

Air Combat Command officials describe the electronically toxic battlefield as a big, emerging joint problem.

"Now the [jamming] density has increased as have the number of people doing it that are out of command-and-control range," Keys says. "That's a problem that has to be solved. I think we probably need to take a step back to the old way we used to control air operations--procedures. We're going to have to tie our larger operations into electromagnetic ops."

A decision Keys does support is the deployment of more MQ-9 Predators with their greater payload, faster speed and higher operating altitude. The increase is hampered by the bottleneck of adequate crews and UAV cockpits at Nellis AFB, Nev., control center for operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.

"Our intent is to stand up [MQ-9] orbits as fast as we can," Keys says. "We think we have a couple of extra birds that we've got the [capability] to man and control. I think we're planning to go to four in-theater." The Air Force's UAV base is at Balad AB north of Baghdad. He also notes that the cockpits have been upgraded so each UAV crew can now control two UAVs simultaneously. However, the original goal of flying four UAVs at a time from a single cockpit is still considered over-reaching. "That's too many," he says. The new, larger Predators are going to carry a full load of sensors plus "four Hellfires and two 500-lb. bombs."

(Archives)