| Hill sells un-'sanitized' surplus By Lee Davidson Deseret Morning News January 23, 2006 Pentagon inspectors say officials at Hill Air Force Base (and three other facilities) often approved selling equipment as surplus without ensuring removal of components or data that America does not want to fall into the hands of enemies. That includes selling computers without verifying that their memories were erased. It includes clearing for sale without sanitization some guidance and control systems for missiles, infrared or laser tracking systems, safety and arming devices and more. Some items were actually sold, and others were caught by inspectors before sales occurred, according to Air Force Audit Agency reports obtained by the Deseret Morning News through a Freedom of Information Act request. "Equipment specialists did not always properly code items requiring demilitarization (the removal of dangerous or sensitive components and data). Inappropriately assigned codes can compromise military technology, national interests, public safety and security," said a report about problems at Hill's Ogden Air Logistics Center. But in response to Morning News inquiries, the Ogden ALS issued a statement saying it had researched the items it had released as surplus and concluded they "do not present a danger to the public. The assets contained no classified, sensitive or controlled information." However, inspectors wrote that such risky release easily could have happened (and maybe did) because of scores of errors they found in spot checks at Ogden and the Air Force's other two logistics centers — Warner Robins in Georgia and Oklahoma City — and at Lackland Air Force Base, Texas. Those four bases manage the life cycle — from production to destruction — of thousands of weapons, aircraft parts and myriad other types of equipment. They decide how much "demilitarization," if any, of items is needed before their sale as surplus. Random sampling by inspectors showed that officials at Ogden had given the wrong codes in computers about how to handle demilitarization eventually for 52 percent of items reviewed; Lackland had miscoded 50 percent; Warner Robins miscoded 42 percent; and Oklahoma City had miscoded 33 percent. An example that inspectors noted from Ogden's records is that a flight simulator trainer "valued at $52 million was coded as 'no demilitarization necessary' when it should have been coded as a Security Classified Item, requiring demilitarization before physical transfer to the Defense Reutilization and Marketing Office." Some other items that inspectors said were miscoded by officials at Ogden included a warhead subassembly for a guided missile, a safety and arming device, a guidance and control system and an infrared seeker sensor. Regardless of how equipment types have been coded previously in computers, equipment specialists are supposed to double check just before items are released as surplus whether coding is correct and any planned sanitization is adequate. But inspectors said that at Ogden, "Equipment specialists did not property review DEMIL (demilitarization) codes at disposition." Inspectors said officials at Ogden had not reviewed coding on 18 percent of released items sampled in an audit. And upon further review, all of those items (covering 40 types of equipment) needed more sanitization than was actually performed initially. Inspectors also found that of those 40 types of items released by Ogden, 13 had already been sold to public "commercial vendors" by the time inspectors found the problems. That included a variety of aircraft parts, including selling two leading edges for the wings of fighter jets without any sanitization. Inspectors said Ogden should have required "total destruction of item and components to preclude restoration or repair. . . . As an alternate, burial or deep water dumping may be used." Reports show the Air Force asked the purchaser to return those items, but reports do not say whether that was successful. Other items sold to the public without proper sanitization included equipment used to test guided missiles and guided missile launchers. Inspectors said officials should have removed or demilitarized their "key points, lethal parts, components or accessories." Inspectors found that 27 types of equipment that had been released for sale by Ogden without proper sanitization had not yet been sold. They were retrieved and properly demilitarized, and in some cases destroyed. Inspectors also said that officials could not verify whether memories were erased on many computers that were sold. They said that happened with four of 25 computer sales it reviewed that were overseen by Ogden, and 43 of 81 reviewed at Warner Robins. Inspectors noted, "Properly sanitizing computer media helps prevent . . . compromise of military technology, national interests, public safety, and security if military capabilities or sensitive information were released to the public." Inspectors blamed most of the problems on lack of training for equipment specialists. At Ogden, inspectors said 38 percent of such specialists interviewed had not attended "demilitarization courses." Also, 56 percent who had received initial training and were eligible for a refresher course had not received it. Inspectors said that occurred "because management states training funds were not available." Inspectors noted that the cost of holding a five-day class at a local facility would be about $13,000, or $441 per student. Inspectors called for more money for training, which numerous levels of command endorsed and said they would build it into budgets. A statement from Ogden said, "We have followed the auditors' recommendations by assigning DEMIL (demilitarization) codes, updating training course materials and adding more training classes. We conscientiously continue to aggressively conform to applicable governmental regulations." |