How To Judge A QDR Look for New Ideas, Strategy-Resource Consistency Defense News January 9, 2006 By Pierre Chao, a senior fellow and director of Defense-Industrial Initiatives at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, and senior advisor at Credit Suisse investment bank. The Pentagon will release its 2005 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) in just under a month and pundits are already opining on whether it is a “success” or a “failure.” Strange for a document that has not been finalized or released yet, but all part of the Washington game. It does beg a fundamental question, however: What exactly defines a successful QDR? Certainly, one legitimate method of judging the QDR would be to assess it against the expectations and goals set by the Department of Defense leadership. A year ago, senior officials outlined some guiding principles for the 2005 QDR in various public forums. In those speeches, the effort was rightly described as an attempt to align strategy with the appropriate resources while balancing risk, all within the context of an uncertain strategic environment. The scope of the exercise was intended to span the entire spectrum of challenges, but with a focus on irregular and asymmetric threats that drew upon the lessons of Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom. Finding ways to adapt existing capabilities and weapon systems for these new threats was an established goal. There was a stated desire to run the process in an open and transparent fashion; to create a competition of ideas within the department; and to receive a wide range of inputs by engaging allies, Congress, industry, the think tank community and the public. The effort was described as senior leadership-driven rather than bottom-up process-driven, with a focus on a few big issues rather than hundreds of little questions. It was to use the new analytical tools and language of capabilities-based planning. It was to assume a flat defense budget environment — be “resource neutral.” Finally, the QDR was described as a means to seed the ideas that would change future thinking and drive future programmatic decisions (there was an expectation that follow-on execution road maps would be generated). How many of these DoD-established goals and desires were realized can be measured in a month. A QDR should also be judged by the consistency and coherence of its internal logic. If there is a claim that U.S. military forces must be more mobile, agile and expeditionary, is that matched with arguments for the required supporting capabilities (airlift/sealift, tankers, transformed logistics, etc.)? If there is a strategic goal to have U.S. forces better able to conduct irregular warfare, is that matched with arguments for new skill sets, new doctrine, training, etc.? Furthermore, the internal logic should be driven by a coherent vision that runs through the document. Even more importantly, that vision should be easily articulated to Congress and the broader public. The consistency of the logic and the presence of a single voice in the QDR will provide insights into whether this was ultimately a senior leadership driven or a bottom-up exercise. If one metric is internal consistency, the QDR also should be assessed for its consistency with other strategy documents. This is particularly relevant given that the National Defense Strategy was in place prior to this QDR effort, unlike previous reviews when the strategy was developed simultaneously. A QDR that does not reflect or contradicts the National Defense Strategy, or is out of synch with the National Security Strategy, has problems. The QDR’s ability to introduce new ideas and a new vernacular is also important because the QDR is as much an intellectual as a strategy exercise. How many new ideas were introduced? How “out of the box” was the thinking? Was the effort idea constrained or resource constrained? Identifying which new ideas survived the vetting process, who killed off the new ideas and why would provide insights into how much the Pentagon’s thinking has changed. One might claim the QDR should be judged by its process as much as by its content. In fact, you can argue the process is even more important than the document itself, particularly if you view the QDR as a report valid only for a fleeting moment in time. If that is the case, then it will be the success of the process that truly defines the success of the QDR effort. The central questions then become: how inclusive was the effort, how many people and organizations did it touch? By engaging the department and forcing individuals to answer questions about new threats, new ideas and new issues, did it change thinking? Was the Pentagon shifted further in its thinking about transformation and irregular threats than what is revealed in the 2005 QDR? Will this different thinking manifest itself in future decisions? From this perspective, the obsession the press, Wall Street and pundits have with major program cancellations as the only evidence of new Pentagon thinking is misplaced. Better to look deeper, just as history will show that Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld’s true impact on transformation will be eight years of picking senior military leaders rather than a raft a program cuts. The final set of metrics is the harshest one: How much actual change does the QDR engender, and does the strategy survive its first contact with reality? Again, change does not necessarily mean program cancellations. It should encompass changes in doctrine, organization, processes, personnel, budgeting and other areas. Whether budget and resources are shifted to match the new strategy is certainly an important metric, but it should be placed in context. It is more important to measure alignment of strategy and resources than just how many dollars were moved. It also is more relevant to look at how much of the discretionary budget available for reallocation was shifted, rather than at the percentage of the overall defense budget. Ultimately, it will take years before an honest assessment can be made of the real impact of this QDR. There will certainly be enough fodder for everyone to provide an opinion as to whether this was a successful effort or not; just wait another month.